Grappling with "data power": normative nudges from data protection and privacy by Lynskey, Orla
Grappling with "data power": normative nudges from data protection 
and privacy
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104186/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Lynskey, Orla (2019) Grappling with "data power": normative nudges from data 
protection and privacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 20 (1). 189 - 220. ISSN 1565-
3404 
https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0007
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Grappling with ‘Data Power’: Normative Nudges from Data Protection and Privacy  
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The power exercised by technology companies is attracting the attention of policymakers, 
regulatory bodies and the general public. This power can be categorised in several ways 
ranging from the ‘soft power’ of technology companies to influence public policy agendas to 
the ‘market power’ they may wield to exclude equally efficient competitors from the 
marketplace. This paper is concerned with the ‘data power’ exercised by technology 
companies occupying strategic positions in the digital ecosystem. This data power is a multi-
faceted power that may overlap with economic (market) power but primarily entails the 
power to profile and the power to influence opinion formation.  
While the current legal framework for data protection and privacy in the EU imposes 
constraints on personal data processing by technology companies, it ostensibly does so 
without regard to whether or not they have ‘data power’. This article challenges this 
assumption. It argues that although this legal framework does not explicitly impose 
additional legal responsibilities on entities with ‘data power’, it provides a clear normative 
indication that the volume and variety of data and the reach of data processing operations 
are relevant when assessing both the extent of obligations on technology companies and the 
impact of data processing on individual rights. It suggests that this finding provides the 
normative foundation for the imposition of a ‘special responsibility’ on such firms, analogous 
to the ‘special responsibility’ imposed by competition law on dominant companies. What 
such a ‘special responsibility’ might entail in practice will be briefly outlined and relevant 
questions for future research will be identified.  
 
1. Introduction  
The publication of the ‘Cambridge Analytica’ files has served to bring political and 
regulatory attention to bear on the power exercised by technology giant, Facebook. Yet, 
policymakers in Europe have been alert to the power of internet platforms for several years.1 
	
1 A platform is defined in the Commission’s public consultation as ‘an undertaking operating in two (or multi)-
sided markets, which uses the Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but interdependent 
groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the groups’. European Commission, ‘Public 
For example, in 2015 the European Union (EU) Commission suggested that the way in which 
certain online platforms ‘use their market power raises...issues that warrant further analysis 
beyond the application of competition law in specific cases’.2 The EU Commission was right 
to suggest that the power exercised by digital platforms leads not only to economic 
consequences (which fall primarily within the scope of competition law) but also has broader 
societal ramifications. These economic and societal consequences stem, in large part, from 
the control exercised by digital giants over vast quantities of data, including personal data, 
leading some to query whether technology giants should be (further) regulated.3 Critics of 
such further regulation suggest that targeted legislation – data protection legislation – already 
exists to regulate the processing of personal information by technology giants. Furthermore, 
they may suggest that competition law is waiting in the eaves, ready to be applied to curb the 
excesses of market power should the need arise. This article contributes to this debate by 
advocating that the rights to privacy and data protection found in European human rights 
instruments – in particular the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – provide 
the normative foundations needed to justify the introduction of additional legislative and 
regulatory measures designed to tackle ‘data power’. It also outlines some such potential 
measures and seeks to promote future scholarship on this topic by identifying pertinent 
research questions pertaining to each of them.  
This paper shall therefore be structured as follows. In section two, the concept of ‘data 
power’ shall be introduced and outlined. Section three then examines the extent to which the 
EU privacy and data protection framework4 takes account of scale and size, both in terms of 
the quantity of personal data processed and the size of the entities controlling personal data 
processing operations. This section concludes that although the legal framework does not 
	
consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and 
the collaborative economy’ (September 2015). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud, 5/. 
All urls last accessed on 9 April 2018, unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COM 
(2015) 192 final, 12. 
3 For instance, see: Aliya Ram, ‘Tim Berners-Lee hits out at big tech companies’ Financial Times, 12 March 
2018. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/743c9032-230c-11e8-add1-0e8958b189ea ; Jane Dalton, 
‘Facebook and Google are becoming too big to be governed, French president Macron warns’, The Independent, 
1 April 2018. Available at:	https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/facebook-google-too-big-french-
president-emmanuel-macron-ai-artificial-intelligence-regulate-govern-a8283726.html; and, for academic 
commentary, Lina Khan, ‘The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate’ (2018) 9(3) Journal 
of European Competition Law and Practice 131.  
4 As ‘privacy’ is a general principle of EU law (see Case C-137/79 National Panasonic v Commission [1980] 
ECR I-2033, paras 18–20), the EU jurisprudence fully incorporates the Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence and 
therefore this can be described as part of the EU legal framework.  
explicitly impose additional legal responsibilities on entities with ‘data power’, it provides a 
clear normative indication that the volume and variety of data processed and the reach of data 
processing operations are relevant when assessing both the extent of obligations on 
technology companies and the impact of data processing on individual rights. Section four 
then identifies some of the potential policy ramifications of this finding and maps a future 
research agenda to explore the options identified.  
2. The ‘Data Power’ of Technology Companies  
 
2.1 Defining ‘data power’  
The power exercised by technology companies could be classified in numerous often- 
overlapping ways. For instance, technology companies exercise what might be described as 
‘policy power’, a form of soft power allowing them to influence public discourse and policy 
discussions. This policy power was the subject of critical attention in the Summer of 2017, 
for example, when the head of ‘Open Markets’ at the New America Foundation, a 
Washington-based think tank, was allegedly dismissed from the Foundation as a result of his 
outspoken criticism of Google.5 Such power can also be exercised when technology 
companies fund academic papers, an equally contested practice, or, more commonly, when 
they engage in lobbying. The EU’s new data protection legislation – the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)6 – has the unenviable honour of being the most lobbied piece 
of EU legislation to date.  
Equally, we might think of the power exercised by technology companies as a form of media 
power. This is because online platforms such as Google and Facebook have the power to 
influence opinion formation by controlling what content their users see and when they see it. 
Users of social media increasingly rely on it as a news source while search engines are a 
credence good, leading to the so-called ‘search engine manipulation effect’ or SEME.7 SEME 
does not mean that search engines deliberately manipulate their users but rather that users 
	
5 Kenneth P. Vogel, ‘New America, a Google-Funded Think Tank, Faces Backlash for Firing a Google Critic, 
The New York Times, 1 September 2017. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/anne-
marie-slaughter-new-america-google.html.  
6 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
7	Robert	 Epstein	 and	Ronald	E.	Robertson,	 ‘The	 search	engine	manipulation	effect	 (SEME)	
and	 its	 possible	 impact	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 elections’	 (2015)	 112(33)	 Proceedings	 of	 the	
National	Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	of	America	E4512-E4521.		
trust search engines to provide them with neutral, objective answers to search queries and 
thus they have the power to sway public opinion. Yet, although technology companies have 
this influence over opinion formation and exercise de facto control over the effectiveness of 
freedom of expression in the digital context, they generally benefit from intermediary liability 
exemptions and are not treated as media outlets and subject to traditional press regulation.8  
This power of technology companies might be classified in a third way as ‘market power’. 
Market power is a concept used in the application of competition law and economic 
regulation and is defined as the power of a company to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.9 Competition 
law intervention is, to a large extent, conditional upon a company occupying a dominant 
position, or acquiring a dominant position, on a relevant market and abusing that position of 
power.  
In order to define the relevant market, a price-based substitutability test is applied which 
queries whether a customer would switch to another supplier if a company increased its 
prices in a small but significant manner. Companies to whom users would switch in the event 
of such a price increase operate on the same relevant market, and therefore exercise a 
competitive constraint on one another. However, if one company has – amongst other 
things10 – a high market share on that market, it could be in a position of market power. What 
should be immediately apparent is that such a test does not adequately capture the 
relationship between individuals and digital platforms. First of all, many platforms are ‘free 
at the point of access’, therefore users find it difficult to perceive a change in price between 
platforms. Secondly, while platforms may compete on one side of the market (for instance, 
social networking sites, search engines and e-commerce platforms may compete to attract 
advertisers), users do not experience these platforms as competitors. For example, a user 
wishing to purchase a second-hand bicycle is more likely to turn to E-Bay than to Facebook 
in her search. Thus, the concept of market power – as currently defined – does not necessarily 
reflect the true power of certain platforms as experienced by users. Indeed Pasqualte accuses 
some scholarship of promoting the ‘structural production of ignorance’, by ‘characterising 
scenarios as “consent” and “competition” when they are experienced by consumers and users 
	
8 In the EU this follows from Articles 12-15 of the E-Commerce Directive [Directive 2000/31, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in 
Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market 2000 O.J. L178/1/. (EC)  
9 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207.  
10 Other factors, such as barriers to entry to a market, the stability of the market etc might be relevant. 
as coercive and manipulative’.11 Moreover, legal mechanisms that rely on the concept of 
market power, such as competition law and economic regulation, are concerned with 
economic harm rather than broader societal harms, a fact that has been noted by the European 
Commission.12 Yet there have been calls in recent years to incorporate broader societal 
values, such as privacy, into economic assessments of the impact of competitive practices on 
quality13 and for a change in how markets are defined so they more accurately reflect the 
reality of digital markets. For instance, the French Conseil National du Numerique has 
suggested that the notion should consider factors other than market share such as the power to 
‘undermine innovation through control of key resources, critical access points, visibility, 
information, etc.’14 To date, these calls have however largely fallen on deaf ears.  
It is for these reasons that this paper introduces the concept of data power. Data power is a 
multi-faceted form of power stemming from a company’s control of data flows. Digital 
platforms are able to control such data flows as they are an example of a two, or multi-sided, 
market. This means that they act as the intermediary between one side of the market, for 
instance individual internet users, and others with whom they connect, including other 
individuals, advertisers, service or content providers. As online platforms act as an interface 
for these online interactions, they are in a unique position to control the flow of information –
between participants in the digital ecosystem, and to gather data about the actions of each of 
these parties in the digital sphere.  
While all digital platforms have this potential ability to control and gather data, some 
companies appear to have a superior ability to do so as a result of the volume and the variety 
of the data available to them. This is most notably the case of Facebook and Google, which 
shall be considered as examples here. These platforms can be set apart from others in four 
(non-exhaustive) ways. First, these platforms are omni-present in the digital environment. For 
instance, in 2016 only two of the top 10 smartphone applications in the US (based on the 
number of average unique users per month) were not owned by either Google or by 
Facebook.15  Moreover, as discussed below, their presence has been augmented by a lax ex 
	
11 Frank Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust and Power’ (2013) George Mason Law Review 1009,1011.  
12 Digital Single Market Communication (n 1 above), 12.  
13 Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, ‘Family Ties: The Intersection between Competition and Data 
Protection in EU Law’ (2017)1 Common Market Law Review 1.  
14 Conseil National du Numerique (CNNum), ‘Platform Neutrality: Building an open and sustainable digital 
environment’, May 2014 (available at http://www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf), 21. 
15 Sarah Perez, ‘Facebook & Google dominate the list of 2016’s top apps’, 28 December 2016. Available at: 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/28/facebook-google-dominate-the-list-of-2016s-top-apps/ 
ante regulatory regime for mergers and acquisitions, allowing Google and Facebook to 
acquire would-be competitors and innovators. Crucially, this omni-presence allows these 
companies to gather a significant volume of data from a wide variety of sources. 
Furthermore, these platforms act as critical chokepoints (or gatekeepers) in the digital 
ecosystem: the exclusion of an application from Google’s Android Operating System is likely 
to scupper its economic viability while Facebook and Google Search can significantly impact 
the extent to which information is disseminated by making it more or less visible on their 
platforms.  
2.2 The implications of ‘data power’  
It is suggested here that, just as the actions of a company with ‘market power’ have an 
additional impact on the relevant market on which they operate, the actions of strategically 
placed companies with ‘data power’ have detrimental effects on individuals beyond that of 
companies that do not have ‘data power’. While an exhaustive enumeration of such 
consequences is beyond the scope of this paper, two examples will suffice. First, the 
implications of profiling based on personal data processing may be particularly acute when 
conducted by those with data power.16 Profiling can be used to differentiate between 
consumers based on the quality or the price of goods and services offered to them.17 In 
practice, a company with data power could facilitate such a practice by restricting the 
products that are displayed to consumers or changing the order in which they are listed to 
display poorer quality products first in some circumstances. Profiling can also prey on user 
vulnerability.18 While such profiling is not the sole purview of the digital platform with data 
power, it is problematic in this context. In particular, it exacerbates the asymmetry of power 
between companies which already have a ‘self-reinforcing data advantage’, and their users 
who are rendered transparent by this process to their own detriment.  
	
https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/28/facebook-google-dominate-the-list-of-2016s-top-apps/ . Apple Music and 
the Amazon Application were the only two exceptions with Google owning five applications (YouTube; Google 
Maps; Google Search; Google Play; G-mail) and Facebook owing three (Facebook; Facebook Messenger; 
Instagram). 
16 The techniques used to profile or categorise individuals have been clearly outlined by the CMA in its report 
on uses of consumer data, and by the FTC in its report on data brokers. FTC, ‘Data Brokers: A Call for 
Transparency and Accountability’, May 2014; and, CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data: Report on the 
CMA’s call for information’, CMA38, June 2015. 
17 As the CMA notes, the ‘collection of consumer data may enable firms to make judgments about the lowest 
level of quality needed by consumers/groups of similar consumers. This may enable a firm to engage in quality 
discrimination where quality differences are not reflected in the price of goods or services.’ 
18 Studies conducted by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) on online targeted advertising and pricing, 
indicate that certain misleading pricing techniques could ‘result in consumers making purchasing decisions they 
would not have made were prices more clearly advertised, or spending more than they needed to’.    
 A further concern is that those with data power will go beyond registering perceptions and 
create them. Research indicates that a Google search for Caucasian names present more 
neutral results than for typically African-American names. Given the reach of companies 
with data power and their control over the flows of personal data, this has the potential to 
have a tangible impact on opinion formation, including on political issues. As such, this data 
power leaves individuals open to manipulation and exploitation in ways that are difficult to 
detect and quantify.  
Given these exacerbated concerns in the presence of data power, it is legitimate to query 
whether additional legal obligations should be applied to companies with such power. This 
paper argues that the legal framework for privacy and data protection provides a clear 
normative indication that the volume and variety of data processed and the reach of data 
processing operations are relevant when assessing both the extent of obligations on 
technology companies and the impact of data processing on individual rights. 
3. The Normative Foundations for Regulating ‘Data Power’ in Privacy and Data 
Protection Law  
 
3.1 Insights from the Right to Respect for Private Life  
Pursuant to the case law on Article 8 ECHR, the mere fact of systematically collecting and 
storing an individual’s publicly available personal data can constitute an interference with the 
right to private life. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has emphasised that an 
individual does not waive his rights by engaging in public activities that are subsequently 
documented.19 It has also held that it is irrelevant whether this systematic collection and 
storage of data inconveniences the applicant, or whether the information concerned is 
sensitive or not.20 The ECtHR has not had the opportunity to consider whether the 
aggregation of distinct datasets by a public authority (for instance, the consolidation of 
personal data held by a tax authority with that held by a department for social welfare) 
constitutes an interference with the right to privacy. However, it is suggested that such 
personal data aggregation can, in some circumstances, interfere with the right to private life. 
This is because personal data reveals more than the sum of its parts. By combining 
	
19 Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (unreported) 4 May 2000 
20 Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843.  
information from different quarters, it is possible to infer more about an individual than each 
individual piece of information reveals. The EU Court of Justice made its support for this 
theoretical underpinning explicit in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment.21 It highlighted that 
the aggregation of communications traffic data permits ‘very precise conclusions to be drawn 
concerning the private life of individuals’ and that the retention of such data ‘is likely to 
generate in minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject 
of constant surveillance’.22 Indeed, this is why one of the critical ‘v’s’ in the four v’s often 
discussed in the Big Data context is ‘variety’, or variety of data. Moreover, this aggregation 
can render the individual totally transparent, allowing the entity holding the information to 
know perhaps more about the individual than he knows about himself. This transparency is 
problematic as it may have a chilling effect on individual behaviour. It can also leave the 
individual vulnerable to influence and discrimination by third parties. Furthermore, as 
information is power, and it increases the quantity of information in the hands of the entity 
aggregating data, it also increases the power of that entity and therefore exacerbates pre-
existing power and information asymmetries.  
At present, the systematic collection, storage and aggregation of personal data by companies 
with data power has an equally– if not more – negative impact on the rights of individuals as 
when these activities are undertaken by public authorities. Indeed, companies with data 
power are often referred to as gatekeepers as they have the power to determine what 
information can and cannot be made available to their users (by controlling the proverbial 
gate). Pursuant to regulatory theory, gatekeepers are non-state actors with the capacity to alter 
the behaviour of others in circumstances where the state has limited capacity to do the 
same.23 This movement away from state actors towards the exercise of quasi-regulatory 
powers by private actors leaves a potential gap which, it is suggested, most of the recent 
regulatory initiatives targeted at digital platforms are grappling to define and to fill. This 
therefore begs the question whether there is a normative justification for extending the 
application of fundamental rights, or the duties flowing from these fundamental rights, to 
these actors. This question has, however, already been resolved by the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR through its use of the doctrine of ‘positive obligations’. According to this doctrine, 
	
21 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others EU:C:2014:238.  
22 Ibid, [37]  
23 Emily Laidlaw, ‘A framework for identifying Internet information gatekeepers’ (2010) 24(3) International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 263, 265.  
the State has a positive duty to take concrete steps in order to guarantee fundamental rights.24 
Such a positive duty to protect the fundamental right to respect for private life has been 
recognised by the Court in its jurisprudence.25 Therefore, it can be said that the ECHR rights 
not only secure protection against the State but also protection by the State.26 In the context 
of the right to private life this therefore means that the State has a positive obligation to 
safeguard the privacy rights of individuals from interference by other individuals and, 
critically, private entities such as companies with data power. The extension of such human 
rights obligations to private actors has not been without controversy. For instance, it has been 
suggested that it ‘trivialises, dilutes and distracts from the great concept of human rights’ and 
that ‘it bestows inappropriate power and legitimacy on such actors’.27 According to 
Frantziou, one of the primary concerns in this regard is that the imposition of human rights 
obligations on private actors will ‘eventually reduce fundamental rights to ordinary private 
law claims, thus removing their symbolic value and the normative superiority that the possess 
constitutionally’.28  
Two points might be made in this regard. First of all, if regulation is introduced to strengthen 
the obligations incumbent on private parties to respect fundamental rights, such regulation 
does not directly impose fundamental rights obligations – it does so indirectly. What is at 
stake is therefore the indirect application of fundamental rights obligations. Similarly, the 
interpretation of legislative provisions in light of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter clearly 
creates obligations for private parties, albeit indirectly. Secondly, and beyond this semantic 
point, it can be argued that there is a strong case to be made to extend such fundamental 
rights considerations to private parties in the online environment. This is because, as the 
French Conseil Nationale du Numerique acknowledges, the digital ecosystem cannot be 
stifled ‘under the oligoplisation by multinationals, whose influence equals or surpasses that of 
the State, but whose interests do not necessarily encompass the general interest’.29 Put 
simply, given that the human rights system was codified in order to curtail the power of the 
State, when private parties exercise similar – or greater – power, it is legitimate to curtail this 
power in a similar manner. This article seeks to go beyond this now widely accepted claim 
	
24 For an early example, see Airey v Ireland (1979–1980) 2 EHRR 305, para 32. 
25 X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235.  
26 Andrew Clapham, ‘The “Drittwirkung” of the Convention’ in R St J McDonald, F Matscher, and H Petzold 
(eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 163, 190.  
27 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (OUP, 2006), 438.  
28 Eleni Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality’ (2015) 21(5) European Law Journal 657, 674.  
29 CNNum, ‘Platform Neutrality’ (n 14 above), 15.  
that the application of human rights obligations should be indirectly extended to private 
actors. It suggests that additional legislative measures can be applied to companies with data 
power as a result of the volume and variety of data they process and the extent of their reach. 
Indeed, existing data protection law provides the normative foundations for such a claim by 
recognising that such factors are relevant when determining the nature and extent of data 
protection obligations.  
3.2 The Ostensible Neutrality of the Data Protection Rules  
The EU data protection rules apply to the ‘processing’ of ‘personal data’, with both of these 
terms defined expansively. This personal data processing is conducted by a ‘data processor’ 
but overseen by a ‘data controller’, the ‘entity which alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of personal data processing’.30 The EU data protection rules do not 
therefore make a (formal) distinction between personal data processing by public or private 
actors. Nor do these rules distinguish between the size of the entities conducting or 
controlling data processing, or the scale of the data processing activities. This is evident when 
one considers how the EU’s Court of Justice has interpreted the so-called household 
exemption. Pursuant to this exemption, personal data processing ‘by a natural person in the 
course of a purely personal or household activity’ falls outside of the scope of the data 
protection rules.31 While this exemption might have been interpreted by the Court to exclude 
small-scale data processing operations from the scope of application of the rules, the Court 
has steadfastly refused to do so. This is most evident in the unfortunate case of Lindqvist. Mrs 
Lindqvist, an elderly Swedish lady who had embarked on a part-time word processing course, 
was criminally prosecuted for unregistered personal data processing when she published the 
personal details of her church colleagues on a website without their consent. The Court in this 
case refused to apply the ‘household exemption’ given that, by uploading the information to 
the internet, Mrs Lindqvist had made it available to an indefinite number of people.32  
The Court has more recently confirmed its restrictive interpretation of this provision in 
Ryneš33, when the processing concerned was of personal data captured by CCTV footage. 
This footage was taken from a camera that the applicant had mounted outside his front door 
to film his garden path and part of a public footpath.  Mr Ryneš was again a sympathetic 
	
30 Art 4(7) GDPR.  
31 Art 2(2)(c) GDPR.  
32 Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, [47] 
33 Case C-212/13, František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů [2014] EU:C:2014:2428.  
applicant: he had installed the camera in response to attacks perpetrated against his family in 
previous years. He had also taken several precautionary steps to limit the interference with 
the rights of others caused by his processing, for instance he did not have real time access to 
the footage captured by the camera and the footage was deleted, if not required for the 
purpose of identifying would-be attackers, on a weekly basis. It was argued that Mr Ryneš’ 
subjective intention was relevant to the application of the exception: he intended to process 
this data for purely personal purposes.34 However, the Court held that the provisions of the 
Directive must ‘necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the 
Charter’ and that exceptions to the Directive must be narrowly construed.35 It therefore 
emphasised that the processing must be purely for personal or household purposes; as this 
surveillance covered a public space (albeit to a limited extent) it could not benefit from this 
exception.36 
Lindqvist and Ryneš give the impression that the scale of personal data processing, or the 
reach of the data controller, are irrelevant for the purposes of the data protection regime. Yet, 
it is suggested that this impression is erroneous, as the Court’s judgment in Google Spain 
illustrates. In that case, the Court emphasised that the personal data processing by search 
engines is distinct from that conducted by publisher websites37 and is more likely to 
significantly affect the individual’s rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data. It 
highlighted that the Google search engine enables any internet user to obtain a ‘structured 
overview’ of information relating to the individual, including ‘information which potentially 
concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without the search engine, 
could not have been interconnected or could have been interconnected only with great 
difficulty’.38 It also emphasised that this potentially detrimental effect on the individual is 
heightened ‘on account of the important role played by the internet and search engines in 
modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous’.39 
It can therefore be concluded that in determining the nature and extent of the interference 
with a fundamental right respective the Court emphasises the interconnected nature of 
Google’s data – a factor determined by the scale of its processing operations – and the 
ubiquity of Google,.  
	
34 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů 
EU:C:2014:2072, para 43. 
35 Para 29.  
36 Para 30 and 33.  
37 Para 36.  
38 Para 80.  
39 Para 80.  
3.3 The Extent of Data Protection Obligations  
While in Google Spain Google’s ubiquity and the quantity of personal data it processed were 
relevant to the Court’s assessment of the extent of the interference with the individual’s 
rights, in the European Commission’s initial proposal for the GDPR the size of the data 
controller was a factor in determining its obligations. In particular, the European Commission 
initially set out specific provisions for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).40 For 
instance, the Commission was required to take appropriate measures for these companies 
when elaborating upon the procedures and mechanisms for exercising the rights of the data 
subject41; when further specifying certain aspects relating to the information to be provided to 
the data subject42 and the responsibility of the data controller to ensure and to demonstrate 
that personal data processing is compliant with the Regulation.43  The Commission had also 
proposed some leniency when it came to sanctioning SMEs for a ‘first and non-intentional’ 
breach of the GDPR, provided that the personal data processing was only ancillary to its main 
activity.44 SMEs were also exempt from the obligation to designate a data protection officer45 
and to maintain documentation of all processing operations46, provided that the personal data 
processing is an activity ancillary to its main activities.47  
These exemptions for SMEs were motivated by a desire to reduce the regulatory burden on 
SMEs48 and, no doubt, in part the initial thinking was that data processing by SMEs was 
likely to be less risky from a human rights perspective. However, the Commission proposal 
faced significant criticism on the grounds that it is inappropriate to distinguish between 
companies on the basis of size in this context: a very small (micro) enterprise might process 
vast quantities of sensitive data (for instance, the programmers of a fitness tracking 
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45 Ibid, Art 35(1)(b) 
46 Ibid, Art 28(4)  
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application) while a very large enterprise with thousands of employees (for instance, a 
textiles manufacturer) might process very little personal data, sensitive or otherwise.  
Although the Commission was cognisant of this criticism and had attempted to mitigate its 
formalistic effects49, it is unsurprising that amendments introduced during the legislative 
process placed less emphasis on the status of SMEs, preferring instead to focus on the scale 
of the personal data processing and the ensuing risks to the rights and interests of data 
subjects.50 For example, the European Parliament replaced the Commission’s proposal that 
SMEs should not employ a data protection officer with a suggestion that only legal persons 
which process data relating to more than 5,000 data subjects in any consecutive 12 month 
period should be obliged to hire a data protection officer.51 This provision was ultimately 
replaced with one provides that an officer is needed if ‘the core activities of the controller or 
the processor consist of processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope 
and/or their purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large 
scale’.52 
Thus, emphasis on size was replaced by an emphasis on ‘risk’ in the final text of the 
Regulation. While some authors53 and the Article 29 Working Party54 assert that the data 
protection regime has always been a framework designed to regulate risk, the emphasis on 
risk in the Data Protection Directive55 and in the jurisprudence of the Court56 is subtle. In 
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55 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/23. For 
instance, Article 8 of this Directive stipulates that the data subject’s explicit consent is required as a legal basis 
in order to process sensitive personal data, which is arguably based on ‘risk’ considerations. 
56 For instance, see Case C-342/12, Worten—Equipamentos para o Lar SA v Autoridade para as 
contrast, the GDPR places a general obligation on data controllers to take appropriate 
measures to implement the Regulation ‘taking into account the nature, context, scope and 
purposes of the processing and the risks for the rights and freedoms of the data subjects’. This 
emphasis on risk is also present in other provisions of the GDPR, such as those on data 
protection by design, the information to be provided to the data subject, data protection 
impact assessments and the security of sensitive data. The controller must take into account 
the risks to the rights and freedoms of the data subject in implementing each of these 
provisions. Unlike the Directive, the Regulation also attempts to identify data processing 
scenarios that might be particularly risky, such as when the data of vulnerable individuals like 
children or sensitive personal data are processed. It also specifies that the risks may be 
‘physical, material or moral’ and identifies some potential harms such as identity fraud and 
discrimination.57  
In the context of the present discussion, it is relevant to note that the GDPR, like the 
Directive, does not formally distinguish between data processing by small or large entities, or 
even on the quantity or scale of the personal data processing. Rather, it prefers to focus on the 
level of risk that a given processing operation may entail. However, this does not mean that 
the Regulation only applies to risky data processing operations: risk does not operate as a 
threshold condition in this way. Rather, as Hustinx points out, a risk-based approach simply 
means that ‘more detailed obligations should apply where the risk is higher and less 
burdensome obligations where it is lower’.58  
Thus, both the Court, through its rigorous interpretation of the household exemption, and the 
EU legislator, by refusing to tailor the application of the GDPR to SMEs, reject an approach 
to the application of the EU data protection rules based on size. No enterprise is too small, or 
no individual too insignificant, to fall within the scope of the data protection rules. However, 
once within the data protection rules, the volume and variety of the data processed and the its 
reach may be relevant in two ways: it may be relevant when assessing the scale of the 
obligations imposed on a data controller and it may be relevant when assessing the impact of 
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data processing on the rights of the individual. As noted above, pursuant to the risk-based 
approach, the scale of the obligations imposed on the data controller may depend on the 
‘riskiness’ of a particular operation: important factors in this regard might include the nature 
of the personal data processed and also the size or scale of the personal data set. In Google 
Spain while the Court did not expressly single out the undertaking’s size or the size of its 
dataset as significant factors, this is implicit in its finding that the ubiquity of Google was a 
crucial element in determining the extent of the interference with individual rights. Thus, we 
can conclude that although EU data protection law is ostensibly ambivalent to data power, it 
in fact provides a clear normative nudge that such power merits particular attention.  
 
4. Tackling ‘Data Power’  
If the normative nudge from data protection and privacy law is accepted and we recognise the 
need to devote additional regulatory attention to companies with data power, it is necessary to 
consider potential causes of such data power and to identify appropriate regulatory responses. 
Several (non-exhaustive) factors that contribute to ‘data power’ might be identified: network 
effects; data as a barrier to entry; data-sharing agreements; data-driven mergers and 
acquisitions; and, a weak culture of data protection enforcement. An appropriate regulatory 
response to data power will address or mitigate these factors. As such, three potential 
responses are identified. At its most evident, the legislative framework for data protection 
could be strengthened. A more dramatic additional option would be to treat companies with 
data power as ‘public utilities’ and to regulate them as such while a more modest option 
would be to prevent companies with data power from artificially aggregating data through 
corporate agreements and data-driven mergers. This article briefly considers each of these 
options, which should not be treated as complements, and identifies pertinent research 
questions for future multi-disciplinary scholarship by those concerned with the rise of data 
power.  
4.1 Enhancing the effectiveness of data protection  
An immediate objection that might be raised to the imposition of additional regulatory duties 
on those with data power is that the very existence of data protection legislation should 
preclude the need for such additional measures. The data protection has thus far failed to 
curtail this power. This might be explained by two factors: one substantive, the other 
procedural. From a substantive perspective, the data protection regime emphasises individual 
control over personal data by granting the individual ‘micro-rights’, which she ought to 
exercise. Yet, it is increasingly recognised that the role of the individual in achieving his or 
her optimal level of data protection should not be overstated: the volume of personal data 
processed as well as the complexity of personal data value chains limit the role the individual 
can meaningfully play in this picture. Information-forcing mechanisms are therefore unlikely 
to be effective given the extent of the power and information asymmetries in the information 
ecosystem. For instance, despite two decades of data protection legislation, the vast majority 
of individuals express concern over the processing of their personal data and feel like they 
lack control over this data and express their concern about this.59 From a procedural 
perspective, the individual has not been assisted in this task of curbing data power through 
robust enforcement of the data protection framework. To date, this framework has been the 
subject of little public and private enforcement and a weak regime of sanctions.  
The entry into force of the GDPR may remedy these deficiencies. Although it remains an 
individual-centric regime, placing increasing emphasis on individual control over personal 
data, it also introduces mechanisms to ensure the more effective enforcement of the data 
protection rules.60 Most obviously it provides for enhanced administrative sanctions for 
breach of its provisions.61 However, it also allows strengthens the hand of the individual vis-
à-vis individuals by introducing a number of mechanisms for redress. As the enforcement of 
data protection law by national data protection authorities and in domestic courts has been 
quite limited to date, the introduction of Article 80 GDPR, entitled ‘representation of data 
subjects’ is perhaps of most significance. This provision enables collective actors to exercise 
the individuals’ right to an effective remedy and to complain to a data protection authority, 
provided that the individual mandates them to do so. Furthermore, Article 80(2) allows 
Member States the possibility to introduce measures enabling representative actors to lodge a 
complaint before a DPA or to have an effective remedy against a DPA or data controller, 
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independently of the data subject’s mandate. The vast majority of EU Member States chose 
however not to implement this provision. Thus, it remains to be seen, and for future 
scholarship to probe, whether the modifications introduced in the GDPR will more 
effectively exercise a constraint on the data power of technology companies.   
4.2 Data as a ‘public good’ and technology companies as ‘public utilities’  
A radical response to the presence of this data power would be to break up or unbundle 
certain technology companies. The European Parliament approved a resolution to this effect 
in 2014 when it called upon the European Commission ‘to consider proposals with the aim of 
unbundling search engines from other commercial services’.62 This resolution fell on deaf 
ears. While unbundling via regulation has occurred in some sectors, in particular where the 
economic operators in the sector are vertically integrated and competitive segments of their 
operations are used to prop up less competitive segments, competition law is often the 
preferred tool to deal with such problems as and when they arise. As Commissioner Oettinger 
put it, breaking up and expropriation are ‘instruments of the planned economy, not the market 
economy’. Even if this option had more political support it poses further challenges for 
policymakers. First, it is difficult to determine which companies should be the target of such 
unbundling measures. For instance, Lotz highlights that Facebook Google, Amazon, Apple 
and Microsoft have all faced objections from users, the public and government agencies and, 
as such, have been lumped together under labels such as ‘Big Tech’, ‘The Frightful Five’ and 
GAFA. She suggests that conceiving of them as such makes their threat and influence 
overwhelming and masks the distinctiveness of their business models and practices.63 
Secondly, the purposes of this unbundling need to be defined. As Bennett Moses rightly 
suggests rather than thinking in terms of ‘regulating technologies’ or specific companies, it is 
preferable to identify how they fit into ‘a pre-existing legal and regulatory landscape’.’64 
Therefore, a crucial preliminary step when considering regulatory intervention of any form, 
especially radical regulatory intervention in the form of unbundling, is to articulate clearly 
what problems we seek to remedy and to identify scientifically the targets of that regulation.  
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This article suggests that data power – the concentration of large volumes of data of different 
varieties in the hands of private economic entities – is the problem and that the holders of 
data power should be the ultimate targets of additional regulatory measures to curtail this 
power. Yet, this claim begs three significant questions, or sets of questions, that merit further 
investigation.  
The first, and potentially most difficult, question to answer is what volume of data and what 
variety of data ought to be deemed problematic. The benefits of large-scale data aggregation 
and processing are frequently extolled in the context of ‘big data’ processing. The predictive 
power of processing such data can, for instance, lead to more relevant search results and 
shopping suggestions as well as the more efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, even in 
the context of public sector data processing the ‘systematic collection and storage’ of 
personal data by public authorities is an interference with the right to private life which can 
be justified. Defining the quantity and quality of data at which private sector data 
consolidation becomes problematic, and the circumstances in which such the disadvantages 
of such consolidation outweighs the advantage is is therefore a formidable challenge.  
The second question relates to the role, if any, network effects and ‘data as a barrier to entry’ 
play in establishing data power. The presence of network effects means that ‘greater 
involvement by agents of at least one type increases the value of the platform to agents of 
other types’ (indirect network effect) or agents of the same type (direct network effects).65 
Therefore, direct network effects might be experienced in the context of a social networking 
service where the more individuals avail of the service, the more utility that service is to 
others. Indirect network effects occur when two or more distinct sides of a market benefit as a 
result of interaction on a platform. For instance, the more users avail of a search engine 
service like Google’s search, the more interest advertising on that platform is for advertisers 
as they will reach a wider possible market. In particular, the data amassed by Google Search 
from past search results can be used by Google Search to enhance the relevance of its future 
search results. This superior ability to attract eyeballs – user attention – leads in turn to a 
superior ability to monetise their offerings. It is unsurprising that the entirety of the growth in 
digital advertising revenue in 2016 was extracted by two companies: Google and Facebook. 
The presence of network effects might point to the conclusion that the markets concerned are 
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‘winner takes all’ markets. Similarly it has been suggested that if data is a barrier to entry to 
certain digital markets, then it is not possible to compete effectively with those already in 
possession of such data. This would further entail and exacerbate data power.  
Both of these questions – whether network effects play a role in establishing data power and 
whether data constitutes a barrier to entry in digital markets – are empirical questions that 
have been singled out as questions but not yet adequately probed. According to Evans and 
Schmalense it is ‘naïve armchair economics’ to suggest that personal data is an indispensable 
input for competition (and therefore the lack thereof is a barrier to entry). Similarly, Varian 
claims that the quantity of data held by a company is never decisive rather it is what is done 
with this data that is important. However, in response it is possible to highlight that, to date, 
companies such as Google and Facebook have sought to guard their own datasets zealously 
and have as discussed below, demonstrated a clear appetite for more data through data-driven 
mergers and agreements. Further, they have offered no alternative to their ‘free-at-the-point-
of-access’ services offered in exchange for personal data. Indeed, Pasquale suggests:  
If the platforms at the heart of the digital economy were entirely committed to 
monetization and efficiency, they would offer consumers more options. A user might 
be offered the opportunity to pay, say, twice the discounted present value of the data 
he was expected to generate for the platform. In return, he is assured that his data is 
unavailable for the platform’s use. But such a seemingly Pareto-optimal arrangement 
is not on offer, and its invisibility suggests why imbalances of power, rather than 
efficiency or consent, ought to be the normative focus of antitrust and privacy law.66 
If network effects are found to play a role in establishing data power it is also necessary to 
query whether these network effects are likely to work in reverse. Such reverse network 
effects are arguably visible in the decline of the shops on suburban high streets in the face of 
competition from digital retailers being a prime example. This is just one small example of 
the broader challenge in this area: regulators deciding to act in this field will need to tackle 
with the so-called Collingridge dilemma, or pacing problem. If regulators intervene too early, 
regulation might be pre-emptive and may not be based on adequate information. However, if 
regulation is delayed to a later stage of the technology’s development and deployment, the 
technology may be too entrenched to regulate effectively.67 As the CNNum points out, timing 
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is of the essence in this context: ‘before a player reaches critical mass, there is not much to 
monitor, but once a player does, it is often too late’.68 Coates refers to this as the ‘Goldilocks’ 
problem, adding a third hurdle based on Schumpter’s ‘creative destruction’69: ‘even when the 
porridge is just right, you still should not eat the porridge because something even better than 
porridge will come along soon’.70  The issue of when to intervene can lead to regulatory 
paralysis. 
Thirdly, if data is necessary to compete in relevant markets and network effects play a 
significant role in establishing and maintaining data power, then it is necessary to consider 
what regulatory remedies might flow from this.  
A more moderate solution mooted is to treat the data held by companies with data power as 
an ‘essential facility’ or a ‘public utility’, rather than treating the company in its entirety as a 
public utility. In considering this solution however two key factors require further 
deliberation: first, what impact would this decision have on innovation? For instance, it has 
been argued that in order to benefit from network effects it is necessary to get the right type 
of customer on board and that this itself is an art. A good example here might be a booking 
application such as OpenTable, where it is not the overall quantity of restaurants that are 
available to book via the application is important. Instead, it is important that the restaurants 
available are in locations where there is a high density of OpenTable users. More importantly, 
the externalities of such data duplication need to be considered: such a solution may be sub-
optimal – or even counter-productive – from a data protection and privacy perspective as, for 
instance, it would mean that personal data may be replicated outside the confines of the 
original data controller-data subject relationship.   
4.3 Preventing the artificial aggregation of data  
 
A third response to data power might be to prohibit the artificial aggregation of data power by 
companies with data through mergers and acquisitions and data-driven agreements. These 
acquisitions have been numerous (Google has acquired, on average, more than one company 
per week since 2010) and often high profile. While Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg stated in 
2010 that the company’s acquisitions were ‘talent acquisitions’, motivated by the desire to 
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recruit the staff of the acquired company, subsequent acquisitions appear to be motivated by 
the desire to acquire data. Facebook’s acquisition of consumer communications application 
Whatsapp is perhaps the most prominent example of this. Facebook acquired Whatsapp in 
2014 for USD$19 billion, having obtained clearance for the transaction from both the US 
Federal Trade Commission and the EU Commission.  
While the EU Commission cleared this transaction on the grounds that it would not 
significantly impede effective competition on any of the relevant markets, it failed to consider 
the impact of potential data aggregation from an individual’s perspective. For instance, when 
considering the potential role of data in the post-merger landscape, it examined only whether 
other companies active in the market for online advertising services would have sufficient 
data to compete. In particular, it concluded that even if Facebook used data gathered via 
Whatsapp to improve advertising on its social networking service, there would continue to be 
a large amount of valuable user data that was not within Facebook’s exclusive control. The 
Commission did evoke privacy, noting that it can constitute an important dimension of 
competition between Facebook and Whatsapp but concluding that they did not compete on 
this basis (ie privacy was not an important factor in the decision to use these applications).71  
The Commission did not however consider whether the potential to aggregate data across 
platforms would have a negative impact on users. Two reasons explain this. First, the 
Commission may have been reluctant to explore this option in full given its firm assertion 
that ‘any privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within 
the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU 
competition law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules’.72 Secondly, the 
Commission may have been confident about this approach as it naively believed that 
integration of data between Facebook and Whatsapp was unlikely to be straightforward from 
a technical perspective. Indeed, the Commission had asked Facebook whether it planned to 
link or match customers’ profiles on Whatsapp with these customers’ profiles on Facebook 
post-acquisition. Facebook had assured the Commission that the matching of Facebook and 
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Whatsapp users would need to be done manually, by the users themselves. The Commission 
however subsequently concluded that this and other information provided by Facebook 
regarding the possibility of matching Facebook IDs automatically with Whatsapp users’ 
mobile numbers was incorrect or misleading and that such information had been provided at 
least negligently. The Commission therefore fined Facebook €110 million.73  
Crucially however, this transaction also boosts the power of Facebook: an already significant 
data aggregator. Other acquisitions, for instance, Google’s takeover of various home 
monitoring and automation developers in 2014, allowing it to gather data from inside the 
home from cameras and smart technology sensors, were also given the go-ahead by 
competition authorities. These conglomerate mergers were not viewed as problematic given 
that Google did not compete with any of the companies it was acquiring. However, once 
again this analysis ignores the data-driven impetus for the transaction and the subsequent 
accumulation of power – data power – in the hands of the tech giants.  
A similar impact could, of course, be achieved through data-driven agreements. Indeed, 
critics of further intervention in data-driven mergers point to this possibility in order to 
highlight its futility. Olhausen and Okuliar, for instance, argues that any attempt to introduce 
privacy considerations into merger control would be thwarted by companies entering into 
agreements with other companies to data-share instead of merging.74 Onboarding agreements 
are on such form of agreement. Onboarding agreements allow for the combination of data 
collected online and offline. For instance, EPIC – a US not-for-profit organisation – is, it is 
reported, currently taking legal action in the US against Facebook on these grounds. 
Facebook allegedly partners with Acxiom which holds data on 700 million people and 
Datalogix which holds $2 trillion worth in offline purchase-based data. Again, in examining 
the legality of such agreements competition authorities consider simply their economic 
effects on equally efficient competitors rather than the broader societal implications of data 
consolidation by private actors. Partnership agreements between those with data power and 
other stakeholders, for instance public bodies, may also aggrevate such power.  One such 
example is the partnership between Deepmind (held by Alphabet, Google’s parent company) 
and the NHS Royal Free Trust in London. This partnership saw the NHS Trust hand over the 
data of 1.6 million patients of the Trust without their consent and without a commitment on 
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Deepmind’s part to separate this data from that held by its parent company. While such 
examples are thankfully rare, they do illustrate that such public-private collaborations may 
augment and enhance the datasets of digital giants.  
Despite this aggregation of data power through acquisitions and agreements,  the competition 
law framework does not at present consider its direct non-economic impact on individuals. 
This situation could be rectified if competition authorities would themselves reconsider how 
they analyse such data-driven mergers and agreements or, preferably, if economic 
transactions could be subject to a parallel non-competition analysis in order to examine their 
broader societal impact. There has been much resistance to the introduction of non-
competition concerns into merger analysis. Yet, given the unprecedented power of 
technology companies, being exercised across all walks of life, this option might be the least 
radical available to policymakers to keep this power in check.  
Precedent for such an assessment of the compatibility of a proposed merger with fundamental 
rights exists. Although the Commission has sole jurisdiction to provide clearance for a 
merger with an EU dimension, a merger may be remitted to a Member State for a further 
assessment on non-competition grounds. This power is provided for by Article 21(4) of the 
EUMR which states that:  
‘Member States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other 
than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the general 
principles and other provisions of [EU] law”.  
 
Most EU Member States have enacted broad powers, in addition to their competition law 
powers, to examine the impact of a merger on the ‘public interest’. In such circumstances, the 
application of competition law, or purely economic considerations, is excluded in order to 
preserve a particular value. Some of the public interests recognized as legitimate in this 
provision are ‘public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules’.75 Member States 
may then prohibited the merger provided that this action is proportionate and non-
discriminatory. This provision does not therefore, as Jones and Davies observe, confer new 
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rights on Member States. Rather, it ‘articulates their inherent power to impose, subject to EU 
law, obstacles to investment or make it subject to additional conditions and requirements, on 
the basis of public interest grounds’.76  
It is suggested that as media plurality considerations can be taken into account when 
analyzing media mergers, a strong case can be made by analogy that data protection and 
privacy considerations should also be taken into account. Media plurality, like data protection 
and privacy, is provided for explicitly by the EU Charter, Article 11 of which states 
unequivocally that ‘the freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected’.  Mergers in 
media markets are therefore routinely subject to a non-competition analysis, with a negative 
impact on media plurality treated as a separate rationale for market intervention.77  
Such a regulatory response does however beg a number of question that require further 
attention. One such question, already mentioned above, is how to identify an objective 
threshold for intervention on the grounds of data power: what factors should be taken into 
consideration? How much personal data is too much? While it is true that it would be 
challenging to pinpoint such a threshold, it would not be impossible. Again, precedent exists 
in the context of media plurality: for instance, the European Commission support an 
independently implemented Media Plurality Monitor (MPM) which enables it to identify 
potential risks to media pluralism in Member States. Moreover, the MPM adopts a broad 
notion of media pluralism that incorporates political, cultural, geographical, structural and 
content related dimensions.78 It should also be noted that even under the current merger 
framework, the Commission is asked to make assessments that involve quasi-subjective 
metrics. For instance, how can decreased choice weighted against increased efficiency? Such 
incommensurability abounds even within the ‘objective’ economics-based framework of 
competition law.  
5. Conclusion  
As the Conseil National du Numerique acknowledges, the strength of internet platforms lies 
in their ‘ability to create great value from the data retrieved from users’. It also, however, 
suggests that the use of this data must ensure respect for the ‘data rights’ of users and that 
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77 For a discussion of how this operates in the UK, see Rachael Craufurd Smith and Damian Tambini, 
‘Measuring Media Plurality in the United Kingdom: Policy Choices and Regulatory Challenges’ (2012) 4(1) 
Journal of Media Law 35.  
78 For further information and access to the 2016 report see: http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/ .  
recent events have illustrated that current practices do not make it possible to reach these 
goals.’79 This article has argued that more must be done to tackle ‘data power’. The rights to 
data protection and privacy, through their preference for data minimisation and 
disaggregation and their attempts to curtail the implications of power on individuals, provide 
a solid normative foundation for such additional measures. The challenge is however to 
identify practical regulatory responses to such data power. This paper has suggested a number 
of options and identified relevant queries for scholars concerned with data power to 
interrogate.  
	
79 CNNum, ‘Platform Neutrality’ (n 14 above), 6.  
